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Abstract
Using a Hotelling spatial model, this paper examines the inter-
relationship between resource rents in related exhaustible resource
markets. In a product space context, we show that even if two exhaust-
ible resources are not currently in the same market (e.g., coal and
oil), differential scarcity will link their current scarcity rents.
This applies analogously in geographic markets. Another result is
that monopoly accelerates depletion of substitutes and may not affect
time to depletion of the monopolized resource.

I. INTRODUCTION
Three fundamental results in the economics of exhaustible resources
are: (a) resource rents rise at the rate of interest and depend on
resource demand and the initial stock of the resource; (b) monopoly in
an exhaustible resource increases price, depresses initial production
rates and extends time to exhaustion; and (c) higher grade resources
are extracted first. In this paper we show that all three of these
conclusions must be modified in markets involving multiple exhaustible
resources that are not perfect substitutes for each other.
We show that rent for an exhaustible resource depends on costs,
demand, and stocks of that resource as well as costs, demand, and
stocks of substitute resources. Ignoring stocks of substitutes will
lead to an over-statement of rents. Thus the Hotelling rent asso-
ciated with oil depends on reserves of oil, gas, and coal. In a
spatial context, the rent on coal in Kentucky depends on reserves
in Kentucky and elsewhere, even reserves in Australia. Although the
essence of economics is that "everything is interrelated," this direct
connection between rents for resources that are not perfectly substi-
tutable is usually overlooked.
Furthermore, the maxim that "monopoly is the conservationist's
best friend" will not necessarily apply to goods that are substitutes
for the monopolized good. Certainly OPEC has effectively conserved the
For instance, the 1970s debate over the Hotelling and monopoly
rents for oil, vis-a-vis OPEC, generally focused only on reserves of
oil (e.g., Pindyck, 1978).
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world's oil resources although it has accelerated the depletion of
other energy resources such as coal.
Finally, a basic result of the grade selection literature is that
least cost reserves are exploited first. In actual fact, one sees a
multiplicity of different grades simultaneously extracted. While
there can be microtheoretic reasons for lower grades being produced
in conjunction with higher grades (see Slade, 1988), we show that in
a spatial market with costly transportation, one expects different
grades of a resource to be produced at any one time.
A related issue concerns the basic definition of an economic
2
market. Marshall (1920), drawing on Cournot, defines a market as the
area within which the price of the same good tends to uniformity,
allowance being made for transportation costs. Although this basi-
cally refers to the geographic extent of the market, the definition is
frequently interpreted to mean that products are in the same market
when their prices move together through time (Stigler and Sherwin,
1985). We show that as long as there is some degree of substi-
tutability between two exhaustible resources, then their rents will
be related and thus are likely to be correlated over time. In a
geographic context, this result can be interpreted as saying that even
though two geographic markets may be distinct and non-overlapping, the
sharing of a common boundary is sufficient to relate the rents
throughout the two markets. This result calls into question the
2
The concept of market or economic market as used here may not
coincide with the notion of a relevant market as used in an anti-
trust context (see, e.g., Scheffman and Spiller, 1987).
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usefulness of price correlation for establishing an economic market
for an exhaustible resource. Furthermore, the fact that rents rise
over time will cause some markets to contract and some to expand their
geographic scope over time.
In the next section of the paper we set up a simple linear
Hotelling model of spatial competition (interpretable as product
space or geographic space) with a resource deposit at each end of the
line. We then explore the relationship between rents at these two
deposits.
II. THE SPATIAL MODEL
3
We first consider the case of a Hotelling spatial model. As in
Hotelling's (1929) original model, we consider a linear market—
a
straight line of unit length with consumers distributed along it. In
contrast to Hotelling and much of the related literature, we are not
concerned with entry of producers. We assume that there are two
resource deposits, located at each end of the line segment. Produc-
tion will be characterized by constant returns with constant marginal
production costs. A competitive transportation industry connects
producers and consumers.
3
Although the Hotelling model was first proposed by Hotelling
(1929), it has been extended by many authors, including Smithies
(1941), Lerner and Singer (1937), Greenhut (1952), Eaton (1972),
Hartwick and Hartwick (1971), Eaton and Lipsey (1975), and d'Aspremont
et al. (1979). See Graitson (1982) or Eaton and Lipsey (1989) for
recent reviews of this literature. A significant portion of this
literature concerns entry which is not an issue here.
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As pointed out by Hotelling (1929) and others, while this model is
couched as a model in geographic space with conventional transporta-
tion, it can also be viewed as referring to product space. The goods
at the two ends of the line have different levels of a characteristic.
Consumers locate along the line according to the level of the char-
acteristic which gives them maximum utility. If a consumer must take
a good produced elsewhere then the utility associated with consuming
that good is diminished in proportion to the distance between the
producer and consumer.
For instance, consider that copper and aluminum are at the two
ends of the line with the characteristic being weight/durability or
some other continuously varying characteristic that has copper at one
extreme and aluminum at the other. Consumers closer to the copper end
obtain utility from consuming aluminum but obtain more utility from
copper. Similarly, consumers at the aluminum end obtain more utility
from aluminum. Consumers in the middle are indifferent between the
two products. When prices are introduced, consumers may prefer to
consume a distant commodity that gives less utility provided the price
is right.
In the model we assume that consumers are uniformly distributed
with unitary density along a line of unitary length. Consumers at
each location consume at a rate according to the individual demand
function q(p). Placing the origin at the left-most end of the line,
producers are assumed to be located at and 1. For the time being,
we assume producers are price-takers. Other notation is as follows:
b.: average unit production cost, i = 0, 1
S.: initial stock of resources at i = 0, 1
l
X : initial resource rent at i = 0, 1
t(»): unit transport cost for the resource as a function
of distance
t: time e [0,°°)
M(t): location of market boundary for producer 1 at time t
T .
:
time of resource exhaustion for producer i, i = 0, 1
T: min(T ,T
1
)
r: rate of Interest.
Without loss of generality, we assume that producer is exhausted
first (i.e., T = T«). There are two basic types of regimes over the
two-firm production horizon [0,T„]. The first is that the market is
always covered; i.e., all consumers are served throughout the period.
The second possibility is that for some consumers delivered prices get
so high that they choose not to consume. The first case is more
common and is what we focus on here.
A. The Competitive Solution
We first consider the case that reserves at each end of the line
segment are owned by many price-taking producers. At a particular
point in time, t < T~
,
the market boundary, M(t), is defined by
b
o
+ V^ + t(m) = b i + V^ + T(1 "M) (2)
which is a consequence of the fact that at the market boundary M, the
delivered price from the two producers is equal. Implicit in this
equation is that Hotelling resource rents rise at the rate of interest
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(Hotelling, 1931). This also implies that two differential grades of
resources (t>
n
* b ) may be exploited simultaneously (0 < M < 1). This
is of course a consequence of the spatial separation of the producers.
Similarly, T is the point in time where M becomes zero:
b
o
+ V^ + t(0) = b i + x i &VT + t(1) (3a)
b. + t(1) - [b
n
+x(0)]
=> T = 1 In H r -^ }. (3b)r A
"
X
l
Since logarithms are only defined over non-negative rents and since we
can reasonably assume that producing area 1 cannot initially undercut
producing area at in costs, net of rent, it must be that
X
Q
> Xj. (4)
This occurs because over time, as producing area moves towards
exhaustion at T, M moves towards 0. This happens because for a
particular location delivered prices from are rising more rapidly
than from 1. Thus is losing customers to 1. But this is what
wants: wants to lose customers such that at time period T the last
ton is being produced and producers at area 1 are knocking at the
gates of the mine. This can also be seen by rewriting (3a) as:
X
"
X
l
= {b
l
+ T(1) " [b +T(0)]}e"rT . (5)
This says that the rent premium enjoyed by producing area is equal
to the cost margin between the two producing areas, measured at pro-
ducing area 0's location, discounted back to the present from the time
of exhaustion of producing area (T). Thus if T is very large, rent
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differences may not be great. In essence, producing area 1, by
gradually eating away at producing area O's market, is effectively
reducing overall demand while simultaneously acting as a "backstop" to
producing area O's rent. Both of these effects diminish the rent of
producing area 0.
This result can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : In the competitive spatial Hotelling model with a
deposit of an exhaustible resource at each end of the line segment
[0,1], with exhaustion of deposit occurring first, at time T,
initial rents are related as in equation (5).
The actual level of rents can only be found by integrating demand
for each producer's output and setting it equal to initial stocks of
resources
:
S
Q
= / / q[b +X e
rt
+T(z)]dzdt (6)
T M(t)
r
T 1
S = / / q[b + X e
rt
+x(l-z)]dzdt
M(t) l l
oo i
+ / / q[b + X e
rt
+T(l-z)]dzdt (7)
TO
Equations (6-7) are two equations in the two unknowns, A. and X and
thus can generally be solved for X„ and X . Unfortunately, without
more structure, equations (6-7) cannot be solved analytically. Later
in the paper we will simplify the problem somewhat so that equations
(6-7) can be explicitly solved.
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B. The Monopoly Solution
Suppose we now consider the case where production at is monop-
olized while production at 1 remains competitive. We will continue
assuming that location is exhausted first. Rent at location will
be assumed to include both Hotelling rent and monopoly rent and will
be denoted X (t). Equation (2) defining the boundary between the two
market areas still applies, though in a slightly modified form:
b
Q
+ X
Q
(t) + t(M) = bj + X ie
rt
+ t(1-M). (2')
This equation implicitly defines M. Profits for the monopolist are
given by
T M(t)
f X(t) e"
rt
/
which is maximized over X(t) and R(t), remaining reserves at 0, sub-
ject to the restrictions
M
R = -/ q(X(t)+b +x(x))dx (8b)
u
X
Q
(T) = X ie
rT
+ x(M) (8c)
R(T) = (8d)
R(0) = S
Q
(8e)
which yields the current value Hamiltonian
M(t)
H = U (t)-u(t)][/ q(X(t)+b Q+T(x))dx] (9)
for which first-order conditions with respect to X and R are
n
Q
= / q(X(t)+b +x(x))dxdt (8a)
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||-: u(t) - XQ(t)[l +7^y] (10a)
d
M(t)
where e(t) =
d £n x
t-z ln{f q [XQ (t)+b +T(x) ]dx}
3H. p(t)
_. nn . s
1r : U(o" r (10b)
plus the transversality condition on T. Equation (10b) is the
familiar condition that the marginal value of the resource must rise
at the rate of interest. Equation (10a) relates the marginal value of
the resource to the markup (X~(t)). The e(t) term is simply the price
(rent) elasticity of aggregate demand for production from 0.
Clearly e(t) < 0, in which case then equation (10a) implies
my •
u(t) < ^
n
(t). However, whether or not ^M^ > r depends on e(t):
r ,
u(t)
,
X (t) kt) nn
M(t) " X Q ( t ) e(t)[e(t) + l]
'
UW
the rate at which the price elasticity changes over time. For elastic
demand, the relationship between X
n
/X and r depends on the sign of s.
If demand becomes more inelastic over time, the markup will rise
faster than the rate of interest. However, if storage is costless,
this will bring about intertemporal arbitrage, basically resulting
in e(t) < or X/X
_< r (see Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). This in turn
implies ^
n
(0) is at least as great for monopoly as in the competitive
market and further that T is at least as great for the monopoly case
as the competitive case.
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III. RECTANGULAR DEMAND
While the models discussed in the previous section have the ob-
vious advantage of being general, it is for that reason that it is
difficult to obtain definitive comparative statics results. Other
authors have adopted restrictive assumptions on demand. Hotelling's
original spatial model assumed totally inelastic demand. This of
course will not work, with an exhaustible resource since rents will be
bid infinitely high. Eaton (1972) and Smithies (1941) assume linear
demand while Lerner and Singer (1937) assume rectangular demand; i.e.,
inelastic demand up to a "backstop" or "choke" price at which point
demand drops to zero. This later assumption is particularly common in
exhaustible resource markets where there is some backstop price at
which a non-exhaustible substitute enters.
We thus adopt the assumption of rectangular demand in this section
of the paper. Demand is uniformly distributed over the [0,1] line
segment with each consumer's demand being for one unit of the resource
per unit time at prices below the backstop, p.
We also adopt the common convention (e.g., Eaton and Lipsey,
1975; Novshek, 1980; Graitson, 1982) that transportation cost is a
linear function of distance d: f(d) = ad.
We assume reserves and costs are such that the market is always
covered as long as both producers are in the market; i.e., we do not
have the situation where both areas are producing with a gap in the
middle of the line segment where neither area is able to supply at a
price less than the backstop. Furthermore, producing area has
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insufficient reserves and/or high enough costs that It never serves
the entire market. The result of this assumption is that there are
three natural time segments. In segment [0,T~], both areas are
producing and the entire market is served. At time T~
,
area is
exhausted although location O's price at T~ need not be the backstop
price. In fact T
n
is the point in time at which area 1 can deliver to
at the price area is offering FOB (i.e., without transportation).
The second time slice is [T
n
,T
ni ] and corresponds to the time where
area 1 is supplying the entire market. Finally the period [T„, ,T ]
corresponds to time period where area 1 serves only part of the market
and in fact just exhausts his resources at T.
.
A. A Competitive Market
The first market we consider involves multiple producers at each
end of the line segment [0,1], with each producer a price-taker. The
first question is to define the market boundary for producing
region 1, M(t). This can be obtained from equation (2):
f b
l
- b
Q
+ (X
1
-X )e
rt
+ ct
_
M(t) = /\
b, + X. rt
—
- p + a
K 1
< t < TQ
T
<
t < T01
T < t < T
01 - - 1
t > T,
(12)
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T
n ,
Tm , and T. can similarly be obtained from equation (2) or, for the
case of T^. , when the right-hand side of (2) equals the choke price p:
bj + a - bQ
*0 r xo" x l
01
=
l_
r
Jin
P -»1
x
l
- a
T
l
m
r
Jin
P
- b
l
(13a)
(13b)
(13c)
'1
Equations (6-7) can now be written for this case:
s
- /
o
°
M(t)
- ^~ (<VVa) *n[4^] - *v\rV xi> (14a)
TO T01 T l
S = / [1-M(t)]dt + / dt + / [1-M(t)]dt (14b)
T T01
Ti T Ti
=
J dt - J M(t)dt - / M(t)dt
T
i
Equation (14a) may now be substituted into equation (14b) to obtain:
Tj T!
S = / dt - S n - / M(t)dt (14c)
T01
1
P_b
l 1 -
(P_b i)
= - In — S„ {(b.-p+cOHn + a}
r X ar l 1 v ,—
, N
'
1 (p-b.-a)
= > ^n X
1
=
-(Sq+S^t-I + ^{(p-b
1
)4n(p-b
1
)-(p-b
1
-o)£n(p-b
1
-a)} (15)
A comparative statics question naturally arises as to the effect
of transportation costs on rents. As we increase a, moving from a less
spatial market to a more highly spatial one, markets shrink (the
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backstop becomes "closer") which drives down rents while competition
between producing areas is reduced. Totally differentiating (14a) and
(15) with respect to a, X~, and X. and using (15) directly, yields
respectively
dx iXl t^V^Hi^1K-
V
( —) =
,
— ; s (16a)da da ^0011
dX X (p-b,) p-b, -a
^_ = _i {! + L_ ln[ L_]}. ( 16b )da a L a _ , '
In our case it must be that p-b. > a, otherwise producers at 1 could
— 4
never deliver to producers at below the choke price p. Thus in (16b),
dX./da < 0. As transportation costs increasee, the rent for producers
at 1 decreases. Maximum rent occurs when a = 0. Unfortunately,
equation (16a) does not allow us to make a definitive conclusion about
the sign of dX_/da although we suspect it to be negative. We can
summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 : Assume a spatial Hotelling model with deposits of an
exhaustible resource at each end of the unit interval, with rectangular
demand and costs and resource stocks such that the entire market is
covered while both producers are in the market. Without loss of
generality, assume producers at are exhausted first. Then for
producers at 1,
4
The expression in braces in (16b) is 1 + [£n(l-x)]/x which is
always negative for < x < 1.
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(a) Hotelling rents are less than they would be if space were
ignored (costless transport), with the two resource deposits
treated as one; and
(b) increases in transportation costs lead to reductions in
Hotelling rent.
The implications of this proposition are quite fundamental. In
a spatial market, rents are not just determined by demand and supply
within the area served by a producing region. Rather, ignoring space
and looking at rents that would be realized from aggregating all
demand and supply places an upper bound on rent. In essence, a pro-
ducing area with a large resource endowment depresses rents far beyond
its current market area.
B . One Producing Region Monopol ized
We now consider the case where producing area is monopolized.
All other assumptions remain as above. Thus there are multiple
price-taking producers at 1 and a single price-making producer at 0.
Let the price net of costs for producer at the mine be X(t). Thus
X(t) includes monopoly rents and scarcity rents. This is the "markup"
that the monopolist applies to his resource. Let X„ = X(0). The
market boundary is defined as:
' b. - b + X e
rt
- X(t) + a
—
L
-= < t < Tn2a — —
T < t < T
Kt) -< h (17)rt —
b + X e - p + a
— T < t < T
a 01 - - 1
1 t > Tj
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where T
n
is the point where producer is exhausted, T„. is the point
where producers at 1 are no longer able to supply below the choke
price p and T. is the point where producers at 1 are exhausted (by
assumption T~ < Tm < T,). It is more difficult to solve equation (2)
for T
n
in this case because we do not know how X(t) evolves over time.
We defer defining TQ , Tq,, and T,.
Producer 0, as a monopolist, seeks to maximize profits by choosing
a time path of markups, X(t). The current-value Hamiltonian, from
(9), is
b -b
n
+\ e rt -X(t)+a
H = [X(t)-y(t)]{ U * } (13)
for which first-order conditions are
. 1
b -b +X e
rt
-X(t)+a
|f: [X(t)-u(t)][- ±-] + I \„ 1 = (19a)a\ Za za
||: u(t) - ru(t) = 0. (19b)
Equation (19a) may be solved for y(t):
u(t) = 2X(t) + bQ - (b 1 +a+X 1 e
rt
). (20)
This equation defines the marginal value to the monopolist of the
resource (u(t)) which, according to equation (19b) must rise at the
rate of interest. Combining equation (19b) and (20) we obtain
b +a-b
d fci[X(t) -
L U
]
r
2
—
-r (21)
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which can be solved for X(t):
b.+o-bn . b.+a-b.
X(t) - {X --L_-0}ert + -^T-^ (22)
Since b, + a > b
n
,
equation (22) tells us that X(t) rises at a rate
less than the rate of interest, r.
We are now in a position to use equation (2') to define T
n ,
T
ni ,
and T,
l
b
i
+ot-b
n
T
o
= 7 M 2(x * } ° .q l (23a)
p-b -a
T
01
-
I *n
-z— (23b)
1
P
"b
l
T. - - Jin -^—- . (23c)
1 r S
Note that the expressions for Tm and T. are identical in form to the
competitive case (equation (13)) although the times may be different
since X may be different.
Conditions that stocks balance flows can now be specified
/ M(t)dt = S, (24a)
T Tqi T!
/ (1-M(t))dt + / ldt + / (l-M(O)dt
TO T01
Tl T Tj
- / ldt - / M(t)dt - / M(t)dt - S. (24b)
T01
Equation (24a) may be substituted into equation (24b) to obtain
-17-
Tl T l
S = / dt - S - / M(t)dt. (24c)
Tqi
Note however that the expressions for T~. and T. are identical in the
monopoly case to the competitive case (compare equations (24b-c) to
equations (13b-c)). Furthermore, M(t), for Tq. <. t <_ T. , is identical
in the two cases (compare equation (17) with equation (12)). Thus,
equation (24c) is identical to equation (14c) which implies A. is
identical and thus is as given by equation (15). Thus, whether or not
producing area is a monopolist has no effect on the scarcity rent
at 1.
We are now in a position to examine X_, We noted from equation
(22) that X(t) rises more slowly than the rate of interest. Since
prices for producers at 1 are the same for the monopoly case as the
competitive case, it must be that X_ is elevated in the monopoly case
over what would prevail in the competitive case. Otherwise producer
would produce more than S~.. We summarize these results in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 : Let the assumptions of Proposition 2 apply except
that producing area is monopolized. Then
(a) The fact that producer is a monopolist does not effect
the Hotelling rents for (price-taking) producers at 1.
(b) The initial price for producer (net of transport) is
elevated relative to the competitive case. Furthermore,
the price net of costs rises at a rate less than the rate
of interest.
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(c) Monopolization of producing area results in accelerated
depletion of producing area 1 initially followed by some
conservation of the resources of producing area 1 (compared
to the competitive case).
(d) The time to exhaustion of both deposits is unaffected by
the fact that producer is a monopolist.
This proposition has a number of rather startling implications.
Monopolization of one producing area does not elevant rents in
separate areas. We thus have the result from Proposition 1 that
scarcity rents at the two deposits are related yet extraction of
monopoly rent at one deposit will not affect scarcity rents at other
locations. In effect, monopoly at one location results in an ini-
tially smaller market area for the monopolist (relative to competi-
tion), with increased inroads by other producing areas. But because
the monopolist's market area shrinks more slowly than in the competi-
tive case, during some later period of time the monopolist's market
area is actually larger than in the competitive case with exhaustion
of the monopolist's deposit delayed. Relative to the competitive
case, the other producing area initially produces more and later
produces less with the overall time of depletion of all deposits
remaining the same in the two cases. Thus the maxim that "monopoly is
the conservationist's best friend" must be modified. Monopoly does
depress initial production by the monopolist but it accelerates
initial production from others. The overall time to complete ex-
haustion is the same with monopoly and pure competition. Of course
it goes without saying that these results do depend on our assumptions.
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C. Extensions to Product Space
The discussion in the previous two sections was confined to
geographic space with a representing true unit transportation costs.
However, as Hotelling recognized in his 1929 paper, and as is dis-
cussed earlier in this paper, space may also be interpreted as product
space. Transport costs are analogous to the monetary value of
disutility where goods transported further generate less utility.
Consider two exhaustible resources which are substitutes but not
perfect substitutes. They are on opposite ends of a unit interval
in product space (e.g., coal and oil or copper and aluminum).
Proposition 1 states that rents associated with one exhaustible re-
source depend on the scarcity of the other, even if the two appear
currently to be in distinct markets. Thus the scarcity value of oil
depends not only on how much oil is available but on how much coal.
Even if the resources are in separate uses now, the net price of the
scarcer resource will rise faster; thus as time proceeds the two
resources move closer and closer together in the minds of consumers.
If this price of oil were far higher than it is today, coal would be
used in many applications that are currently the sole province of oil.
That is why the rents are coupled. Attempts that have been made to
estimate the scarcity value of oil have erred to the extent that they
ignored other exhaustible resources.
Proposition 2 states that the fact that people discriminate be-
tween the two resources depresses the scarcity rent associated with
the less scarce resource. Thus the fact that some people prefer oil
to coal (all other things being equal) rather than just desiring
-20-
energy in general (regardless of its form) results in a lower scarcity
rent for coal.
Proposition 3 states that monopoly of one resource will not effect
scarcity rents for other substitute resources despite the fact that
monopoly will accelerate near-term production of substitutes. This
will be offset later by higher production of the monopolized resource.
Thus a monopoly in the oil market should not affect scarcity rents
for coal even though demand for coal may be increased in the near-
terra.
Of course all of these results are predicated on the underlying
assumptions of the analysis. Propositions 2 and 3 in particular de-
pend on the assumption of rectangular demand which is probably one
of the simplest representations of demand—valid in some cases and
off-the-raark in others.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the interrelationship between resource
rents in related exhaustible resource markets. Virtually all work to
date on Hotelling rents has examined an exhaustible resource in iso-
lation, taking into account substitutes only via the demand curve for
the resource. However if substitutes are also exhaustible then demand
is not exogenous but contains terras (rents of the substitutes) that are
determined simultaneously with supply/rent of the exhaustible resource.
In a product space context, we have shown that even if two exhaust-
ible resources are not currently in the same market (e.g., coal and
oil), different levels of scarcity will cause them to be in the same
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market at some point in the future which in turns links their current
scarcity rents. Thus ignoring substitutes for an exhaustible resource
overstates rents. A natural extension of this is that current esti-
mates of scarcity rents may be too high. Another result is that while
monopoly for one exhaustible resource may initially conserve that
resource, the monopoly accelerates depletion of substitutes. Further-
more, under plausible conditions, monopoly does not conserve the re-
source over the long run. Ultimate depletion times are unaffected by
monopolization.
The markets for many exhaustible resources are highly spatial, due
to the bulky nature of the commodities and relatively high transport
cost-value ratios (e.g., coal). Such resources are typically viewed
as being supplied in separated geographic markets. For instance, a
western coal market might be considered to be separate from an eastern
coal market. Our results indicate that despite current separation of
markets, differential endowments of resources mean that market
boundaries will shift over time. Thus rents in separate markets are
related. For a particular deposit, the presence of large deposits in
distant locations can and will depress local Hotelling rents. Even if
two deposits appear to be in separate markets today, if at some future
point in time the two deposits are in the same market, then today's
Hotelling rents are related. If one of the two deposits is monop-
olized, the effect will be a higher initial price for the monopolized
deposit and thus a smaller initial geographic market. However, given
our assumption on the market, overall time to exhaustion is not
-22-
affected since the monopolist's market shrinks more slowly than in the
competitive case.
Clearly the interaction among exhaustible resource markets requires
a modification in our views of exhaustible resource markets. This
paper is only the start of examining this question.
-23-
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